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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 20010367-SC 
v. : 
STATE OF UTAH, : Priority No. 3 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner appeals from an order dismissing his petition for extraordinary relief, which 
challenged his conviction for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-302. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(i) and § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Should petitioner's claims be dismissed because they are inadequately 
briefed? 
Standard of Review: "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be disregarded 
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.' Utah R. App. P. 24(j)." State v. Gamblin, 
2000UT44,f 8,1 P.3d 1108. 
1 
Issue II: Did the district court properly dismiss with prejudice the petition for 
extraordinary relief? 
Standard of Review: The following standard of review applies: 
"On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, 'we survey the record in the 
light most favorable to the findings and judgment, and we will not reverse if 
there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be 
convinced that the writ should be granted.'"... Furthermore, we will set aside 
the district court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, and we 
review its conclusions of law for correctness. 
Seel v. Van Per Veur. 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998) (cites omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal: 
Addendum A - Former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Prior convictions.1 Petitioner Thomas had previously been convicted of aggravated 
robbery and aggravated kidnaping in 1980, for which he received sentence of 5 years to life 
(R. 1903-11). He was conditionally released by the Board of Pardons upon parole on April 
13, 1993 (R. 1915, 1919). 
Arrest warrant. On June 18,1993, a warrant for arrest was issued by the Utah State 
Board of Pardons against petitioner Thomas (R. 1927). The arrest warrant stated that there 
was reason to believe that the parole violations of 1) Curfew Violation; 2) Failure to 
1
 The fact that petitioner was on parole from his previous conviction is relevant to 
the argument concerning his arrest and revocation hearing. 
2 
Maintain Employment; and 3) Failure to Reside at Residence of Record had been committed. 
The warrant authorized the arrest of the petitioner, and return to actual custody pending a 
determination of probable cause to believe he had violated the conditions of his parole (R. 
1927). 
The search warrant and arrest. As part of their investigation of a robbery of a 
Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant which occurred on June 30,1993, police received a lead 
on petitioner Thomas. While some officers guarded his apartment, others went to obtain a 
search warrant. On July 1, 1993, Third District Court Commissioner Frances M. Palacios 
issued a search warrant (R. 1896 and 1937). After obtaining the search warrant, the police 
officers returned to the scene. Shortly thereafter, petitioner surrendered, and the apartment 
was searched. During the search, the police seized evidence linking petitioner to the crime 
(R. 1896). Petitioner was then arrested and booked on charges of aggravated robbery and 
parole violation (R. 1929). On July 6,1993, Commissioner Palacios signed an arrest warrant 
for the crime of aggravated robbery (R. 1931). 
Prerevocation hearing notice. On July 7, 1993, petitioner was served with a copy 
of the prerevocation hearing information, which advised him of his right to a prerevocation 
hearing (R. 1933-35). This notice also advised the petitioner that if he waived his pre-
revocation hearing, he would be returned to prison for a full revocation hearing by the Board 
of Pardons. Petitioner signed the document, specifically waiving his right to a prerevocation 
hearing (R. 1935). 
3 
Underlying criminal case - #931901914. On July 6,1993 an information was filed 
which charged petitioner with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, for the robbery of the Kentucky Fried Chicken 
restaurant (R. 1937). The information also alleged that a firearm was used in the robbery (R. 
1937). On August 4,1995, a jury convicted petitioner of one count of aggravated robbery, 
as charged (R. 1940). Petitioner was sentenced to five years to life in prison, to run 
consecutively with the sentence he was already serving (R. 1942). 
Appeal. Petitioner appealed his conviction (R. 1944). The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the conviction in a memorandum decision. State v. Thomas. No. 960170-CA (Utah App. 
Nov. 29, 1996)(unpublished) (R. 1947-49). The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari (R. 
1951). The Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. See State v. 
Thomas. 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) (R. 1895-1901) (addendum B). 
As to the portion of the case that was remanded, the Court of Appeals affirmed 
petitioner's conviction on February 24,1999(R. 1953-54) (addendum C). A petition for writ 
of certiorari was denied (R. 1962). 
State petition for extraordinary relief which is being appealed. On February 7, 
1995, (prior to his conviction and his subsequent appeal), petitioner filed a petition for 
extraordinary relief. He filed an amended petition on March 27, 1995. On December 21, 
1995, (after conviction) the district court dismissed the petition as premature, because the 
petitioner had an adequate remedy of direct appeal. The Findings, Conclusions and Order 
4 
was entered on January 9, 1996 (R. 1981-84).2 Petitioner appealed. On May 14, 1996, the 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition (R. 1986) 
(addendum D). 
Petitioner also filed in the Supreme Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a 
motion to consolidate his habeas petition with his petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court 
remanded the petition for writ of habeas corpus back to the district court for disposition3 and 
denied the motion to consolidate (R. 1988-91). Then, for unknown reasons, on September 
2
 Subsequent petitions. On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a new petition, case 
#970904051 (R. 2003-4). On August 18, 1997, petitioner filed another petition, case 
#970905822 (R. 2006-8). These two cases were consolidated and petitioner was given an 
opportunity to amend (R. 2004). The case was dismissed without prejudice because 
petitioner failed to ever submit an amended petition (R. 2010-24). 
Federal petitions. Petitioner filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking 
relief on the basis that the search warrant was invalid. The case was dismissed under 28 
U.S.C. 1915(d). The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Thomas v. Palacios. 73 
F.3d 374, 1995 WL 758970 (10th Cir. (Utah)) rhrg denied June 25, 1996 (Unpublished) 
(R. 2016-17). 
After the Utah Supreme Court's decision holding that the commissioner did not 
have authority to issue the search warrant, petitioner filed a motion seeking relief 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district 
court's denial of petitioner's motion. Thomas v. Palacios, 194 F.3d 1321, 1999 WL 
710340 (10th Cir.(Utah)) (Unpublished) (R. 2019-20). 
In 1996, petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 and 2254. He alleged that his conviction and sentence were unconstitu-
tional because a commissioner lacked judicial authority to issue the arrest and search 
warrants. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld denial of the petition. Thomas v. 
State, 134 F.3d 383, 1998 WL 39232 (10th Cir. (Utah)(Unpublished) (R. 2022-23). 
3
 It is likely that the petition was simply remanded to the district court because the 
district court was the appropriate place to file the petition. The Supreme Court may not 
have been aware that petitioner had previously filed a petition for extraordinary relief in 
district court, which had already been dismissed. 
5 
21,1998, in case #981532, the Supreme Court entered an order stating: The district court is 
directed to reinstate the Petitioner's Petition for Habeas Corpus and to process it." (R. 1993).4 
On September 24, 1998, Third District Court Judge Lewis entered a signed minute 
entry stating that the court had already considered and dismissed the legal issues raised. The 
court reiterated that there was no legal basis for the petitioner's release (R. 1995). On 
January 11, 1999, Pat Bartholomew, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, sent petitioner 
Thomas a letter stating: 
this court is without jurisdiction to take further action in the above referenced 
case . . . By order, dated September 21, 1998, this court directed the Third 
District Court to reinstate and process your petition for habeas corpus. It 
appears that such order was complied with and Judge Lewis made a minute 
entry, dated September 24, 1998, finding no legal basis for your release. A 
copy of that order is enclosed. This court's case file was closed November 29, 
1998). 
(R. 1997). 
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Judge Lewis had dismissed the case, and the 
letter from the Supreme Court acknowledges that dismissal, after the recusal of Judge Lewis, 
the case was subsequently reassigned to several other district court judges who successively 
recused themselves. After a status and scheduling conference, the state was ordered to file 
a response. On July 21, 1999, the state filed its response (R. 1682-87). 
4
 In its response to the petition to the district court, the respondent speculated that 
in this order, the Supreme Court was probably addressing the subsequent petition filed in 
case #970905822, rather than case #950900814, which had already been dismissed. 
6 
On February 2, 2000, District Court Judge Noel entered a minute entry stating: "It 
appears to the Court then that this matter has been dismissed with prejudice, and accordingly, 
the Court will take no further action in this matter as the case is deemed to be closed by the 
Court." (R. 1998-2001). Petitioner then filed a motion to vacate the minute entry. Oral 
argument on this issue was held on June 23, 2000. The Court granted the motion to vacate 
the minute entry and ordered respondent to file another response to the petition. 
On August 28,2000, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss as its response (R. 1862-
93). Petitioner filed a Reply (R. 2038-65) and respondent filed a Response to the new issues 
raised in the Reply (R. 2111-29). On February 22, 2001, the District Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision, which granted the respondent's Motion to Dismiss (R. 2380-86) 
(addendum E). On August 22,2001 Findings and Conclusions and a Final Order were filed 
by the Court (addendum F). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
FROM THE CRIMINAL TRIAL5 
"On the night of June 30, 1993, an armed robbery was committed at a fast food 
restaurant [Kentucky Fried Chicken] in Salt Lake County, Utah. At gun point, the assailant 
ordered the manager to put all the money into a bag and to accompany him to the parking lot. 
The manager was then released, and the assailant ran away. Shortly thereafter, police 
officers arrived on the scene and began their investigation of the robbery. As part of their 
5
 These facts are quoted directly from State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 300 (Utah 
1998) (R. 1896) (addendum B). 
7 
investigation, they received a lead on a suspect who was reported to be in a nearby apartment. 
The suspect was defendant Richard Dee Thomas. When the police arrived at the apartment, 
a confrontation ensued with Thomas. The officers forced entry into the apartment but 
retreated after Thomas threatened to kill a hostage.6 Then, while some officers guarded the 
apartment, others went to obtain a search warrant. 
During the early morning of July 1,1993, Third District Court Commissioner Frances 
M. Palacios issued a search warrant. After obtaining the search warrant, the police officers 
returned to the scene. Shortly thereafter, Thomas surrendered, and the apartment was 
searched. During the search, the police seized evidence linking Thomas to the crime.7 On 
July 2,1993, the manager of the restaurant was shown a photo array of six men and identified 
Thomas as the man who committed the robbery. During interrogation and after Thomas 
waived his Miranda rights, Thomas confessed to committing the armed robbery. On July 6, 
1993, the State filed an information against Thomas, charging him with aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner's claims should be dismissed because they are inadequately briefed. 
Petitioner's argument section is disjointed and confusing. Petitioner has not properly 
marshaled the evidence supporting the district court's ruling. He does not provide 
6
 It later turned out that there was no hostage. 
7
 The items seized included a baseball cap, sunglasses, gun, and bank bags with 
coin wrappers and gift certificates. (R. 1953) (addendum C). 
8 
meaningful legal analysis or appropriately challenge the decisions of the district court. 
Instead, he merely sets out points which attempt to assert the same arguments raised in his 
petition for extraordinary relief. This does not conform to the requirements of the briefing 
rule. 
Even if petitioner's brief is not dismissed for inadequacy, the decision of the district 
court should be affirmed because the petition for extraordinary relief was properly dismissed. 
The district court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to relief because some of his 
claims were already raised on appeal, or could have been raised on appeal. The district court 
also correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to relief because he was properly arrested 
on a Parole Board warrant. In the alternative, any irregularities in the arrest warrant or 
charging information were cured by the subsequent valid conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
L PETITIONER'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE 
THEY ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED. 
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for extraordinary relief. However, in 
his appellate brief, petitioner simply raises the same arguments he raised in his petition.8 
Petitioner does not properly challenge the decisions of the district court. He has not argued 
8
 Petitioner also attempts to raise some new issues which were never raised in his 
petition. If a claim was not raised in the petition, and was therefore not addressed by the 
district court, it will not be addressed for the first time on appeal. See Pascual v. Carver, 
876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994). The issues concerning petitioner's confession and the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3) were not raised in the extraordinary 
petition. They therefore may not be addressed now. 
9 
or established that any of the court's findings were clearly erroneous, or that its conclusions 
of law were incorrect. Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis, petitioner merely 
repeats the legal arguments that failed in the district court below, and concludes that he is 
entitled to relief, without explaining how he contends the district court erred. This does not 
conform to the requirements of the briefing rule. 
Inadequate Briefing. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant 
to include his "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented," including 
"the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." Rule 24(a)(9) Utah R. App. P. (2000). 
See also State v. Gamblin. 2000 UT 44, f 6, 1 P.3d 1108 (refusing to consider argument 
which is inadequately briefed); MacKav v. Hardy, 973 P.2d94L 947-48 (Utah 1998). Utah 
courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not be addressed on 
appeal. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). "'A reviewing court is 
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited.'" State v. Snyder, 
932 R2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d439.450 (Utah 1988)). 
Petitioner has not properly briefed the issues. His brief does not identify specific 
errors by the district court. It does not cite to the record, nor does it provide meaningful legal 
analysis. See State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992); Phillips v. Hatfield. 904 P.2d 
1108 (Utah App. 1995). Petitioner does not provide any clear analytical basis for his claim 
that denial of his petition for extraordinary relief should be overturned on appeal. See State 
10 
v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998) (holding that "rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald 
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority"); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (holding that brief "must 
contain some support for each contention"). 
Petitioner's brief also fails to make clear assertions, leaving to the State and this 
Court, the task of divining his position. MacKay, 973 P.2d at 948-49 (rejecting appellee's 
and cross-appellant's claim for failure to make clear assertions or to engage in even a 
"modicum of analysis" where appellee merely "quote[d] or paraphrase[d] the record at great 
length, leaving [the] court with the task of attempting to divine [appellee's] position"). This 
Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument 
and research."' State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404,410 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)), and see Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. Accordingly, petitioner's 
claims should be rejected. See Jaeger, 973 P.2d at 410 (refusing to consider appellant's 
claim due to the lack of meaningful analysis of cited authority); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 
(refusing to address claim on appeal where petitioner's brief "wholly [lacked] legal analysis 
and authority to support his argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 548-49 (Utah App. 
1998) (same); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same). 
Failure to Marshal. Petitioner's claims also fail because his grounds for relief 
ignore the district court's findings and conclusions in support of its rulings. The law is well-
settled that although the Court of Appeals will "review the trial court's conclusions of law 
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for correctness, [it] will disturb findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Further, 
"'we survey the record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and we will 
not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be 
convinced that the writ should be granted.'"" Matthews v. Galetka. 958 P.2d 949,950 (Utah 
App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
A court's findings are "clearly erroneous only if they 'are against the clear weight of 
the evidence'" or if the reviewing court '"reaches a definite and firm conviction'" that they 
are mistaken. State v. Gardner. 844 P.2d 293,295 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). The burden is on the petitioner to marshal all of the evidence 
in support of the district court's findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence does not 
support the findings. State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450,460-61 (Utah 1994). If the petitioner 
makes no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the court's ruling and to demonstrate 
its insufficiency, this Court "accept[s] the trial court's findings as stated in its ruling." State 
v. Benvenuto. 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). 
Petitioner fails to carry his burden. Indeed, petitioner does not even acknowledge his 
burden to marshal the evidence supporting the district court's ruling. Instead, he refers only 
to facts or events which he believes are favorable to his position and then broadly asserts that 
he is entitled to relief. Because petitioner has failed to marshal the supporting evidence and 
demonstrate its insufficiency, this Court should accept the district court's findings. 
Benvenuto. 983 P.2d at 558. 
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Petitioner's claims are inadequately briefed and neither marshal the evidence support-
ing the district court's findings, nor demonstrate its inadequacy. Therefore, this Court should 
decline to consider petitioner's challenge to the district court's ruling dismissing his petition 
for extraordinary relief. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) 
(failure to marshal evidence); Jaeger. 973 P.2d at 410 (failure to meaningfully analyze claim). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED AND 
DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF. 
Even if this Court excuses the failures of petitioner's brief, review of the action below 
nevertheless establishes that the district court properly denied and dismissed the petition for 
extraordinary relief. 
A. The district court properly dismissed the petition for extraordinary 
relief because petitioner's complaints centered on pretrial matters 
that were either resolved on appeal, could have been resolved on 
appeal, or were of such a nature that they would not invalidate the 
conviction and sentence. 
In making its decision to dismiss the petition, the district court found that petitioner 
was not entitled to extraordinary relief because some of his claims had already been 
addressed on appeal, or could have been raised and addressed on appeal. Petitioner was 
therefore procedurally barred from raising them in his petition for extraordinary relief.9 The 
9
 Ruling that claims are procedurally barred has important ramifications in future 
federal habeas review. Federal courts will likely not adhere to a state court's finding of 
procedural bar if the state court addresses the merits along with the procedural bar. See 
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 258 (1989). Therefore, if this Court determines that the 
district court correctly ruled that certain issues were procedurally barred, it should make 
clear that it is affirming the procedural bar as an independently sufficient basis. If this 
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district court then went on to rule in the alternative on the merits of the issues. It correctly 
found that any irregularities in the arrest warrant or charging information were cured by the 
subsequent valid conviction. In addition, it also held in the alternative that there was a valid 
Parole Board arrest warrant. 
1. The district court correctly ruled that the issue 
concerning the validity of the search warrant was 
already decided on appeal. 
Third District Court Commissioner Frances M. Palacios issued a search warrant. In 
his petition, the petitioner argued that the Commissioner did not have jurisdiction to issue a 
search warrant. However, this issue was already specifically raised and addressed on appeal. 
Extraordinary relief is only available where "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is 
available." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). Matters properly heard on appeal cannot be used as the 
basis for granting an extraordinary writ. Jones v. Smith, 550 P.2d 194 (Utah 1976). Issues 
already raised on appeal, or that could have been raised on appeal, are barred from collateral 
attack. Andrews v. Morris. 607 P.2d 816 (Utah), cert.denied. 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct 254, 
66 L.Ed.2d 120 (1980); Wells v. Shulsen. 747 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1987); Jensen v. Deland. 795 
P.2d 619 (Utah 1989). "Issues raised and disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or a 
sentence cannot properly be raised again in a Rule 65 B proceeding, Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 
1029,1036 (Utah 1989), and should be dismissed as an abuse of the writ without a ruling on 
Court chooses, it may then go on to discuss the merits, but review of the merits should not 
be intermingled with the basis for dismissal as procedurally barred. 
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the merits." Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994), cert.denied, 64 USLW 
3241, 116 S.Ct. 97(1995).10 
Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search. 
Petitioner "argued that the issuance of a search warrant constitutes a fundamental court 
function and thus the search and seizure were unconstitutional in that the court commissioner 
who issued the search warrant lacked the authority to do so." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
300 (Utah 1998) (addendum B). Petitioner's motion to suppress was denied. On appeal, 
petitioner argued that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. The court 
of appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari 
review of this issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court said that "while issuing a search warrant does not rise to the 
level of finality as entering judgment and imposing sentence, as was disallowed in Ohms, it 
is sufficiently final to establish it as a core judicial function." Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304 
(addendum B). The Supreme Court found that the court of appeals erred when it held that 
Ohms did not apply and erred in upholding the trial court ruling denying petitioner's motion 
to suppress. Id. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals for a 
determination as to whether the trial court's failure to suppress evidence obtained from the 
search constituted reversible error. Id. 
10
 The Post-Conviction Remedies Act, (which came into effect in 1996), also 
specifically precludes relief on any ground that was raised or addressed on appeal, or that 
could have been raised on appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35 l-106(l)(b)(c). 
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Upon remand, the court ofappeals affirmed petitioner's conviction in a memorandum 
decision filed February 25,1999 (R. 1953-54) (addendum C). The court ofappeals held that 
the trial court's failure to suppress evidence obtained from the search did not constitute 
reversible error. The court noted that even if the evidence had been suppressed, the jury still 
had before it: 
a positive and unequivocal eyewitness identification from the store manager 
who had spent several minutes studying defendant's face while in the store, 
and had come face-to-face with the defendant several times while defendant 
forced the manager across the store parking lot. A neighbor immediately next-
door to the apartment at which defendant had been staying directed police to 
the apartment. Upon arrival, the police were able to see defendant inside and 
confirmed the neighbor's report that a man matching the description given by 
the Kentucky Fried Chicken employees was there. The police guarded the 
apartment until defendant emerged. Most importantly, defendant's voluntary 
and uncoerced confession that he had committed the robbery was also before 
the jury. 
State v. Thomas. 1999 UT App 051 (unpublished) (R. 1953-54) (addendum C). 
The court of appeals held that the "admission of the seized evidence was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt because 'the evidence that was erroneously admitted did not 
significantly contribute to defendant's conviction and other properly admitted evidence 
overwhelmingly established his guilt.'" Id., quoting State v. Genovesu 909 P.2d 916, 923 
(Utah App. 1995). 
Thus, the district court correctly found that the issue of whether Commissioner 
Palacios had authority to sign the search warrant had already been decided. In addition, the 
issue of whether the trial court's failure to suppress evidence obtained from the search had 
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already been decided. Because these issues were already addressed on appeal, they were not 
properly raised in the petition for extraordinary relief. 
The district court properly concluded that petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary 
relief upon his claim that the search warrant was invalid because that claim had already been 
raised and addressed on appeal (addendum E, p. 2). 
2. The district court correctly ruled that petitioner's 
challenges to the arrest warrant and the charging 
information were not raised in the petition. 
The district court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary relief 
on his allegations concerning the arrest warrant and Information because these issues were 
not raised in his petition. The petition (and the amended petition) did not set out in plain and 
concise terms the facts or basis of these allegations, and did not set forth any reasons why 
these claims would entitled petitioner to extraordinary relief (R. 1-6, 21-102, 121-182). 
3. The district court correctly ruled in the alternative 
that petitioner's challenges to the arrest warrant and 
the charging information were issues that could have 
been raised on appeal. 
Even though the district court ruled that the petitioner's challenges to the arrest 
warrant and the charging information were not properly raised in the petition, the court went 
on to find that petitioner was procedurally barred from raising these issues in his petition 
because they could have been raised on appeal. 
Although not apparent from his petition, from statements made by petitioner's counsel 
in court, it appeared that petitioner was attempting to argue that the arrest warrant for the 
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crime of aggravated robbery was invalid because it was signed by Commissioner Palacios. 
Similarly, although not apparent in his petition, from statements made by petitioner's counsel 
in court, it appeared that petitioner was also attempting to argue that the Information was 
defective because it was signed by Commissioner Palacios. 
The court correctly concluded that petitioner's challenges to the arrest warrant and the 
charging information were issues that could have been raised on appeal. As argued above, 
issues already raised on appeal, or that could have been raised on appeal, are barred from 
collateral attack. "Issues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal, but were 
not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding absent unusual circumstances." 
Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d at 613. Petitioner did not allege or establish any unusual 
circumstances or any reason why these issues were not or could not have been raised on 
appeal. The district court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary 
relief because his challenges to the arrest warrant and Information were issues that could 
have been raised on appeal. 
4. The district court also correctly ruled in the 
alternative that any irregularities in the arrest 
warrant or charging information were cured by the 
subsequent valid conviction. 
In addition to the fact that petition was procedurally barred from raising these issues, 
the district court correctly ruled that even if properly raised, petitioner would not be entitled 
to relief on these issues because any irregularity in the arrest warrant or Information was 
cured by the subsequent valid conviction. 
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Case law is clear that "an error at the preliminary state is cured if the defendant is later 
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Ouas, 837 P.2d 565, 566-67 (Utah App. 
1992). The United States Supreme Court has held that "illegal arrest or detention does not 
void a subsequent conviction." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854 (1975). 
Thus, "although a suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause for 
the confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was 
detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause." Id. at 119. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the 10th Circuit have followed this rule. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that even if a probable cause statement was defective, such defect 
did not warrant reversal of an otherwise valid conviction. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 
272 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805, 808 (Utah App. 1988). 
Similarly, "[i]f an indictment has been returned and the defendant is subsequently convicted, 
the conviction will not be reversed for failure to hold the preliminary examination." United 
States v. Aranda-Hernandez. 95 F.3d 977,979 (10th Cir. 1996). 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that "where the only possible prejudice to a 
defendant was a brief period of detention prior to preliminary hearing, '[i]n light of the 
subsequent conviction, that temporary period of possibly wrongful detention is of minimal 
significance and does not warrant a reversal of an otherwise valid conviction.'" State v. 
Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 393 (Utah 1986)(quoting Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 272). 
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Thus, the district court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to extraordinary 
relief because any irregularity in the arrest warrant or Information was cured by the 
subsequent valid conviction. 
5. The district court correctly ruled in the alternative 
that there was a valid arrest warrant as to parole 
violations. 
Petitioner alleged that he was arrested without an arrest warrant, and that he did not 
thereafter receive an appropriate determination of probable cause within 48 hours. As 
addressed above, petitioner was procedurally barred from raising this issue because it could 
have been raised on appeal. In addition, any irregularities in the arrest or charging were 
cured by the subsequent valid conviction. But even further, the district court also properly 
held in the alternative that there was a valid Parole Board arrest warrant. 
Petitioner was arrested on the charge of aggravated robbery without an arrest warrant. 
However, at that time, there was already an outstanding warrant for petitioner's arrest for the 
charges of probation violation (R. 1927). When petitioner was arrested, the booking 
information shows that he was arrested and booked for probation violations, and for the new 
charge of aggravated robbery (R. 1929). The State of Utah parole violation report states that 
the petitioner was detained on the board of pardons warrant of arrest on July 1, 1993. 
("DATE DETAINED ON BOP W/A: 7-1-93") (R. 1909). Petitioner was arrested pursuant 
to an arrest warrant on his probation violation charges. Thus, petitioner was properly in 
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custody regardless of who signed the July 6th arrest warrant for the charge of aggravated 
robbery. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the Fourth Amendment requires a 
prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial 
detention following a warrantless arrest." County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 
47, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991), citing Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 
54 (1975). The court went on to say that "a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations 
of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the 
promptness requirement." McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56. 
Utah law provides that "[i]n order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as 
soon as is reasonably feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a 
determination shall be made as to whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the 
arrestee." Utah R. J. Admin. 4-611(1). But this rule only applies to persons arrested without 
a warrant. This rule did not apply to petitioner because there was an outstanding warrant for 
his arrest on probation violations at the time of his arrest, and he was arrested and booked not 
only for the new crime of aggravated robbery, but also for probation violations. 
Petitioner was not the average citizen, arrested only for the suspected commission of 
a crime. He was already on probation. "[Pjarolees have diminished Fourth Amendment 
rights." State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1262 (Utah 1983). see also State v. Blackwell 
809 P.2d 135 (Utah App. 1991). 
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"It is abundantly clear that probationers 'do not enjoy "the absolute liberty to 
which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly 
dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions."'" 
State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525.529 (Utah APP. 1998)(quoting State v. Martinez. 811 P.2d205. 
209 (Utah Ct.App.)(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164,3168, 
97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)(citation omitted; alteration in original)), cert.denied. 815 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1991). 
The general rule that a judicial determination of probable cause should be made within 
48 hours does not apply to persons already in the state's lawful custody. The requirements 
of a probable cause hearing are not applicable to someone detained pursuant to a probation 
hold. State v. Martinez. 198 Wis.2d 222, 234, 542 N.W.2d 215 (Wis.App. 1995). "[T]he 
interval between an 'arrest' and an initial appearance is never unreasonable where the 
arrested suspect is already in the lawful physical custody of the State." State v. Harris. 174 
Wis.2d 367, 375, 497 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. App. 1993) 
In this case, petitioner was already in the lawful physical custody of the State because 
he was arrested for alleged probation violations. Thus, there was no issue over whether he 
would be released on the new charge of aggravated robbery. Even if technically "released" 
on the new aggravated robbery charge, petitioner would have remained in custody on the 
probation violation charges. See Kelly. 718 P.2d at 393 (defendant would not have been 
released prior to the preliminary hearing because of a parole violation). 
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Thus, the District Court correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to any 
extraordinary relief as to his probable cause claim because there was an outstanding warrant 
for his arrest for probation violations and he was properly in custody for probation violations. 
Therefore the rule requiring determination of probable cause within 48 hours did not apply. 
In addition, petitioner was not entitled to relief because even if there were any problem with 
the determination of probable cause, a valid conviction will not be vacated solely because the 
defendant was detained prior to trial without a determination of probable cause. The district 
court correctly ruled that there was a valid arrest warrant and petitioner's right to a 
determination of probable cause within 48 hours was not violated. 
B. The district court properly dismissed the petition for extraordinary 
relief because petitioner's complaints concerning the Board of 
Pardons and Parole were either without merit or were 
unreviewable by the district court. 
1. The district court correctly ruled that petitioner's 
argument that the Parole Board's warrant was 
invalid was without merit. 
On June 18, 1993, the Utah State Board of Pardons issued an arrest warrant against 
the petitioner for alleged probation violations (R. 1927). The warrant against petitioner 
Thomas stated: 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the above-named parolee 
and to cause him or her to be detained and returned to actual custody pending 
a determination whether there is probably [sic] cause to believe that the 
parolee has violated the conditions of his or her parole. 
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(R. 1927). As addressed above, the district court properly found that the petitioner was in 
custody because he was arrested for alleged parole violations. 
Petitioner argued that the arrest warrant issued by the Board of Pardons was invalid 
based on Salt Lake Citv v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), and State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 
299, 302 (Utah 1998). However, these cases are not applicable to an arrest warrant issued 
by the Board of Pardons. The Board of Pardons is not part of the judicial branch of 
government. The person who makes the determination whether reasonable grounds exist for 
revocation of parole "need not be a judicial officer. The granting and revocation of parole 
are matters traditionally handled by administrative officers." Morrissev v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 
471, 486, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972). 
Revocation of parole is not even a criminal proceeding. "[T]he revocation of parole 
is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in 
such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations." Morrissev v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
480, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972). See also State v. Tate. 1999 UT App 302, ^ 10, 989 P.2d 73, 75 
(UtahApp. 1999). 
"A parole revocation proceeding is a civil proceeding that is entirely independent of 
any related criminal proceeding, even if the criminal charges are based on the same facts as 
those on which a charge of parole violation are based." Peterson v. Utah Board of Pardons. 
907 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Utah 1995). "It is well established that parole revocation is civil, 
rather than criminal, in nature." Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986), citing 
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Morrissey v. Brewer. 408 U.S. at 480. "[T]he revocation of parole is not part of a cnminal 
prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in an ordinary criminal proceeding 
does not apply in parole revocations." Garrett v. State, 768 S. W. 2d 943,945 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1989). A "distinction should be drawn between the rights of a citizen who is merely accused 
of a crime and the rights of a criminal who is under the force of the penal system." Id. 
"[Probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled." State v. 
Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 437-38 (Utah App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
The Board of Pardons and Parole was specifically created by the Utah State 
Constitution. Utah Const. Art. 7, § 12(1) (1953). The board has specific statutory authority 
to issue warrants and to revoke parole. "The board may revoke the parole of any person who 
is found to have violated any condition of his parole." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(1) and 
see § 76-3-202. "Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified 
warrant request to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest, detain, and return to 
actual custody a parolee..." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3). 
Actions of the Board of Pardons are also governed by the Utah Administrative Code, 
section R671-101 through 671 -508 (1993).11 "A member of the Board of Pardons may issue 
11
 Respondent refers to the applicable code sections in 1993, because the allega-
tions of parole violations were raised in 1993. Since then, the code sections relating to 
the Board of Pardons have been changed and amended several times and now consist of 
rules R671-101 through 522. 
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a warrant in compliance with the Board's rule on Evidence for Issuance of Warrants." Utah 
Admin. Code § R671-511-1. 
The board's statutorily authorized power to issue warrants is part of its constitutional 
parole power, the exercise of which does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. See 
Utah Const art 5, § 1; Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-11(3). See also In re Younz 976 P.2d 581, 
584 (Utah 1999)12 (holding that even where one branch of government is "charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to" one of the other branches of government, and the 
function given by the statute is one "appertaining to" another branch of government, if the 
constitution expressly directs or permits the exercise of that function, there is no violation 
of Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Board has the constitutional and statutory authority to issue warrants to "retake" 
a parolee back into custody upon an allegation of a parole violation. In this case petitioner 
was on parole. He was still under the supervisory control of the board of pardons. The board 
properly exercised its administrative authority to return the petitioner to custody because of 
allegations that he had violated the conditions of his parole. Petitioner was in custody 
12
 Speaking to a similar issue, in Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole, 947 
P.2d 664, 668-69 (Utah 1997), the Court addressed whether the Board's power to make 
parole determinations was essentially the power to sentence - an inherently judicial 
power. The Court noted that "the Board's power itself is constitutionally derived." Id. at 
668. The Court held that "the board merely exercises its constitutional authority to 
commute or terminate an indeterminate sentence . . ." and the "Board's exercise of that 
parole power in setting determinate parole dates does not violate the separation of powers 
doctrine of article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution." Id. at 669. 
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because of the valid "retaking" warrant which was properly issued by the Board of Pardons. 
The District Court correctly ruled that petitioner's argument that the Parole Board's warrant 
was invalid based on Ohms and Thomas was without merit. 
2. The district court correctly ruled that petitioner 
waived his right to a prerevocation hearing. 
Petitioner raised an argument concerning the timeliness of his probation revocation 
hearing. The district court correctly ruled that petitioner's argument was without merit 
because he had specifically waived his right to a prerevocation hearing. 
Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1993. On July 7,1993, he was provided with a copy 
of the Prerevocation Hearing Information (R. 1933-35). This form included the charges 
against him and information concerning his rights, including his right to a prerevocation 
hearing. It advised the petitioner as follows: 
In order for you to be held in custody on a Board Warrant, probable 
cause must be established that you have violated the conditions of your parole. 
If a preliminary hearing in a circuit court has been or will be held on 
these charges and you are bound over for trial, probable cause to believe that 
you have violated the conditions of your parole has already been established 
and you do not have a right to a Prerevocation Hearing. 
If a preliminary hearing on these charges has not been held or you were 
not bound over for trial, you may choose to have a Prerevocation Hearing 
based on the following procedure: 
* * * 
You may waive you [sic] right to a Prerevocation Hearing. If you make 
this choice, you will be returned to prison for a full Revocation hearing by the 
Board of Pardons. The Board will determine whether you have violated your 
conditions of parole and whether your parole should be revoked. 
(R. 1933-35). 
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Under Utah Admin. Code § R671-503, a prerevocation hearing should be conducted 
within fourteen days after detention on a Board warrant unless such hearing is expressly 
waived by the parolee. The purpose of the prerevocation hearing is to "determine whether 
there is probable cause to believe that the parolee is in violation of his parole agreement." 
Utah Admin. Code § R671-503-1. 
On July 7, 1993, petitioner signed the Prerevocation Hearing Information form, 
waiving his right to a prerevocation hearing (R. 1935). Thus, the district court correctly 
found that the petitioner had specifically waived his right to a prerevocation hearing by 
signing the waiver of prerevocation hearing form. 
3. The district court correctly ruled that it would not 
review a decision by the Board of Pardons refusing to 
grant a prisoner credit for time served. 
The district court correctly ruled that a decision by the Board of Pardons refusing to 
grant a prisoner credit for time served is within the discretion of the Board. The District 
Court correctly determined that it would not review that decision. 
Case law in Utah has clearly held that "it is not a violation of fundamental fairness for 
the Board of Pardons to not give an inmate credit against his prison sentence for time served 
as a condition of probation;' Rawling v. Holden. 869 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah App. 1994), see 
also Ontiveros v. Utah Board of Pardons. 897 P.2d 1222, 1223 (Utah App. 1995). 
In addition, "[djecisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, 
commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are 
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final and are not subject to judicial review." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3). "[T]he 
Legislature has specifically barred appeals from Board of Pardons orders." Peterson v. Utah 
Board of Pardons. 907 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1995). 
Therefore the district court correctly ruled that it would not review a decision by the 
Board of Pardons refusing to grant petitioner credit for time served. 
C. The district court correctly ruled that the petitioner was not 
entitled to relief based on allegations concerning his request for 120 
day disposition. 
1. The district court correctly ruled that the allegations 
concerning the request for 120 disposition were not 
raised in the original or amended petition. 
For the first time, in his reply to the respondent's motion to dismiss, the petitioner 
raised a totally new issue which was not raised or addressed anywhere in his original petition 
or his amended petition for extraordinary relief. Petitioner argued that he was entitled to 
relief because he was not brought to trial within 120 days from the date of his demand for 
disposition. The district court correctly found that petitioner was not entitled to relief 
because allegations concerning the request for 120 disposition were not raised in the original 
or amended petition. 
2. The district court correctly ruled in the alternative 
that the allegations concerning 120 day disposition 
could have been raised on appeal. 
In addition to the fact that this issue was not raised in the petition, the district court 
also correctly ruled that petitioner was not entitled to relief on this issue because it was an 
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issue which could have been raised and addressed on appeal. As argued above, extra-
ordinary relief is only available where "no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is 
available". Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). Issues already raised on appeal, or that could have been 
raised on appeal, are barred from collateral attack. Andrews v. Morris. 607 P.2d 816 (Utah), 
cert.denied. 449 U.S. 891,101 S.Ct. 254,66 L.Ed.2d 120 (1980); Wells v. Shulsen. 747 P.2d 
1043 (Utah 1987); Jensen v. Deland, 795 P.2d 619 (Utah 1989). 
The issue concerning 120 day disposition could have been raised on appeal, but was 
not. Because this issue could have been raised on appeal, the District Court correctly ruled 
that petitioner was procedurally barred from raising it in his petition for extraordinary relief. 
3, The district court also correctly ruled in the 
alternative that petitioner was not entitled to relief 
because the delay in bringing petitioner to trial was 
largely of his own making. 
In addition to the fact that the petitioner was procedurally barred from raising this 
issue, the district court also correctly ruled in the alternative that the petitioner was not 
entitled to relief because his own actions were the cause of the trial delay. The 120 day rule 
allows a prisoner to make a written demand to have the charge against him brought to trial 
within 120 days of the date of delivery of his written demand. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) 
and See State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d421 (Utah 1991). However, the rule also provides that: 
After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
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In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 davs, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time 
required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) and (4) (emphasis added). 
In this case, there was clearly good cause for the delay. A review of the file and the 
court docket shows that petitioner filed numerous motions for new counsel, and changed 
counsel at least eight (8) times (addendum G). The court informed the petitioner that each 
time he fired another attorney, that time was stayed on his 120 day detainer.13 In addition, 
the petitioner requested continuances, waived speedy trial and specifically waived the 120 
day disposition (addendum G). 
Utah case law is clear that when the defendant himself causes the delay, he is not 
entitled to the protection of the 120 day rule. "[W]hen a prisoner himself acts to delay the 
trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial. Thus, the 
disposition period must be extended by the amount of time during which the prisoner himself 
creates the delay." State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,916 (Utah 1998). 
In State v. Phathammavong. 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah App. 1993), the defendant had 
requested continuances, changed counsel, and agreed to postpone the trial. The court found 
13
 Petitioner also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations 
had run and he was not afforded a speedy trial. The Court denied that motion (R. 2258). 
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that "when defendant requested these continuances, he temporarily waived his right to a 
speedy trial." Id. at 1004-05. "When the prisoner himself acts to delay trial on such charges, 
he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive this protection..." State v. Velasquez, 641 
P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982). "[Although the right to a speedy trial is of paramount 
importance in a criminal case, a defendant who initiates delay is not in a position to demand 
adherence to a statutory time limit." State v. Jensen, 818 P.2d 551, 552 (Utah 1991) 
(citations omitted). See also State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Stillings. 709 P.2d 348 (Utah 1985). 
In this case, petitioner clearly caused the delays himself. He changed counsel 
numerous times, he requested continuances, and he specifically waived his right to speedy 
trial on the record. Thus, there was good cause for the delay, and the District Court correctly 
ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to any extraordinary relief based on the fact that his 
trial was not actually held within 120 days of his demand notice, because the delay was 
largely of his own making. 
D. The trial court had jurisdiction. 
Petitioner attempts to assert that the trial court lacked proper jurisdiction over him. 
Petitioner was charged with the felony of aggravated robbery, alleged to have occurred in 
Salt Lake County. The district court therefore had proper jurisdiction over petitioner for this 
offense. None of petitioner's other allegations change the fact that the district court had 
proper jurisdiction. 
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Petitioner also alleged that he did not receive a preliminary examination within ten 
(10) days of his arrest, and that this somehow deprived the court of jurisdiction. Rule 7(g)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states that if a defendant does not waive the 
preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. It also 
provides that the time period for holding a preliminary hearing may be extended for good 
cause shown. Rule 7(g) Utah R. Crim. P. 
In this case, the information against the petitioner was filed on July 6, 1993. The 
preliminary hearing was originally scheduled for July 13,1993 (R. 2241). The district court 
found that the preliminary hearing was then rescheduled and continued numerous times at 
the request of petitioner and petitioner's counsel due to numerous changes in petitioner's 
counsel and for other reasons (addendum E, p. 5). In addition, the petitioner expressed a 
desire to waive his preliminary hearing. However, the court proceeded with the preliminary 
hearing on December 14, 1993 (R. 2248-50). 
Petitioner appeared to be claiming that a preliminary hearing was never held, but this 
is simply not accurate. The preliminary hearing was held on December 14,1993. Witnesses 
were called, the petitioner was advised of his rights and a plea of not guilty was entered. The 
petitioner was then bound over to District Court (R. 2251). 
The district court correctly found that the petitioner had not established that his 
preliminary hearing was not continued for good cause. Dismissal is not required where, in 
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the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that continuances were granted based 
on what the court determined to be good cause.14 
Petitioner also appeared to be arguing that he was not lawfully bound over, because 
the bindover was done by a circuit court judge. The district court properly ruled that this 
argument was meritless. In State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), the magistrate 
who performed the bindover "also happened to be a circuit court judge (as is true in most 
cases)" Id. at 467. "These individuals, [circuit court judges] when sitting as magistrates have 
the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law upon magistrates and not those that pertain to 
their respective judicial offices." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, a circuit court judge clearly 
had the authority to act as a magistrate to perform the preliminary hearing and issue a 
bindover order. 
In this case, a preliminary hearing was held and the petitioner was properly bound 
over to district court. The district court correctly found that the trial court had proper 
jurisdiction to proceed with the case. 
E. The district court properly dismissed the petition without holding 
oral argument on the merits. 
The district court correctly ruled that there were no factual issues in dispute 
(addendum D, p. 2). The court therefore properly ruled on the case as a matter of law 
14
 In addition, the petitioner would not have been released prior to the preliminary 
hearing anyway because of the alleged parole violations. See State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 
(1986). 
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without holding any evidentiary hearing or oral arguments concerning the merits of the 
issues. 
The rule governing extraordinary petitions does not require an evidentiary hearing or 
oral argument in every case. The rule provides that "[a]fter pleadings are closed, the court 
shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(b)(10) (1995). Thus, it is clear that the court may set a hearing, or may 
"otherwise dispose of the case." Id. In this case, a hearing was not necessary. The court 
properly disposed of the case by ruling on the legal issues. 
In addition, petitioner appears to be complaining that he was not actually brought to 
court. The petitioner's presence is not required for the court to make its decision. The rule 
simply provides that "[t]he petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the proceeding." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(10) (1995). Because the district court resolved the matter on the pleadings 
and motions without oral argument, there was no hearing on any dispositive issue. 
Therefore, it was not necessary for the petitioner to be present. 
35 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the Order of the district 
court which dismissed the petition for extraordinary relief with prejudice. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1% day of October, 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ERIN RILEY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
ADDENDUM A 
(Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (1995) - Extraordinary relief) 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief 
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprison-
ment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate au-
thority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and 
the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ. 
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The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for ex-
traordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special proce-
dures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules, 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state 
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the com-
mitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the 
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern 
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and com-
mitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not 
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement 
(2) Commencement Except for challenges to parole violation proceed-
ings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together 
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in 
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may 
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the 
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings 
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with 
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is 
located. 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims 
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment. 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be 
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The peti-
tion shall state: 
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained; 
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted 
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction 
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceed-
ings, if known by the petitioner; 
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which 
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of 
the commitment; 
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment 
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and, 
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and 
the results of the review; 
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been a b -
dicated in any prior poet-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the 
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the 
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to 
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that abjudicated the legality of 
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If 
copies of pertir.^*; pieacungs, orders, and memoranda are not attached, 
the petition shall state why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition, 
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in 
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the 
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presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who 
issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have al-
ready been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason 
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall 
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is 
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. 
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of 
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court con-
cludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court 
shall designate the portion* of uie petition that are not frivolous and 
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memoran-
dum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney. 
(9) Responsive pleading* Within twenty days (plus time allowed un-
der these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition 
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other 
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county 
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response 
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days 
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memo-
randum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be per-
mitted unless ordered by the court 
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set 
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion 
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery 
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may 
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing confer-
ence, but the conference shall not be set so aa to delay unreasonably the 
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present 
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise 
be present in court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter 
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged com-
mitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, cus-
tody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any 
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general 
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release 
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12) Costa. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as al-
lowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the 
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may 
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may 
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was 
originally charged. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition 
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme 
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those 
courts. 
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule, 
this paragraph (c) shall govern all r:t;t::ns C!?;T.?-~ *u~* - p::::r. hzs 
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been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant 
relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner 
is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is 
occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall 
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the 
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place 
where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the 
restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the tegality of 
the restraint has already been abjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, 
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner 
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner 
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a 
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the restraint 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth 
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may 
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed 
with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in 
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith 
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on 
its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to 
the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of 
the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being 
frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a 
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent 
by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the 
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a 
time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances re-
quire, the court may also issue an order directing the respondent to ap-
pear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint An 
answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has re-
strained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person 
so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the 
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or 
authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to 
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive 
motion* 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be re* 
strained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irrepa-
rable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the 
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent 
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determina-
tion of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been 
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate. 
(6) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent can-
not be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has 
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any 
other process issued by the court may be served on the person having 
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been 
named as respondent in the action. 
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(9) Avoidance of service by respondent If anyone having custody of 
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or 
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, 
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff 
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with 
according to law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court or-
ders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and 
shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person hav-
ing custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall 
state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct 
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the 
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall 
modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the 
petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the 
proceeding to the respondent. 
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court: security. The attorney general may, 
and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for 
relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph (d). Any person who 
is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is 
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acta enumerated in subparagraph 
(2) of this paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if 
(A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by an-
other or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by 
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompa-
nied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for 
costs and damages that may be recovered against the petitioner in the 
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided 
for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a 
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public 
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation 
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer 
does or permits any act that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where 
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally 
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of the state 
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or 
(E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, 
privileges or franchisee. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court 
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to 
appear at the hearing on the merita. The court may also grant temporary 
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are 
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may 
petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where 
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed 
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or 
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person 
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HAS reftiaed tht petitioner ths use or enjoyment of a right or office to 
which ths petitioner ia entitled 
(3) Proceedings on tht petition. On ths filing of a petition, ths court 
may require that notice bs given to advent parties before issuing a hear-
ing order, or may issus a hearing order requiring ths advent party to 
appear at tht hearing on tht merits. Tht court may direct tht inferior 
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other ptnon named 
as respondent to dsliver to tht court a transcript or othtr record of tht 
proceedings. Tht court may also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with tht terms of Rult 65A. 
(4) Scopt of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in 
nature, the courts review shall not extend furthtr than to determine 
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May I, 1993) * 
Advisor? Commit*** Noes. — This nils 
represent* a complete reorganixation of ths for-
mer nils. This nils also revises parts of ths 
former rule dealing with habeas corpus tat! 
post-coavtction remedies. The rule applies «-***• 
trslly ts prncoorllnp that are aocociitifod by 
the absence of aaother plain, woody and ads* 
qvisis remedy in ths court After ths ruis's in-
troductory parsers**, each subsequent pers-
grip* is intended ts dssi with a ospsrsis type 
of proct«dtaf. Thus. subparagraph (b> deals 
wick pnroodinp involving wroaaftii impci*os> 
moat; subparagraph (e) deals with pronoodinp 
involving othor typos of wrongful restraint oe 
personal liberty; psrserapa K4) dsals with pro* 
rcodirtp iavoiviae ths wrongtai use of public 
or corporats authority sad paragraph (e> deals 
with proroodinp involving ths wrongful u*» of 
judicial authority or ths failure ts tiaras* 
such authority. To ths sxtsat that ths tpscisi 
proosduras sat forth in thass paragraphs do not 
cover epodfte prosadursi issues thst arias dss> 
ine a proceeding, th* normal rulss of dvil pro* 
csduie will apply. 
This mis aflsatheiy oHnrinafs ths < 
of ths "writ" from extraordinary relief prccc-
dura. la ths visor of ths advisory rranmitto*, 
ths coaeapt was used inesconeosetiy end 
confusingly in ths (brmer rule, aad thsrs wss 
what it meant in actual pretties, Ths < 
has bssa replaced with tsrma such as "fceenag 
order" aad VeUsT than are a w e dsssripthe of 
the proteduisi reality. 
Piraaraoh fb>. This parssrsph replace* #ub-
Worths mrmar ruts. It i 
men* rofsrdless whothsr th* d*im rtlatas to 
vioUttoa of probstisa or pernio, bus this parm» 
graph doss not govern prooosdinp bsssd upoa 
claims relating ts ths terms or rrmditinns of 
confinement Claims futatiag » ths tsrms or 
conditions of confinement ars ptaraad by eue> 
paragraph (a of ths rule. Paragraph \bu as s 
general matter, umpliflos ths plesding re-
quiromsats in wrongful imprisonment caaas 
and contains thras significant changoa from 
procsdui* under ths former nil*, first, th* 
psrseraph requires tho printing judp to as* 
sign wrongful imprisonm*nt casas "if possibl*" 
to tho judge who issued th* eommitmoat ordsr. 
9*eomi th* rul* allows ths court to 
frivolous claim* before any answer or othor re-
sponsive pioodiaf is required. This provision is 
patterned after th* federal practice pursuant to 
18 V S.C. I 2254. Third, the attorney pnersi 
or county attorney must m* a responsive 
pisediag only after ths court has concluded 
that ail or part of ths petition is not frivolous 
on its face and has directed the dork to serve a 
copy of the petition. The advisory committee 
adopted the summary procedures est forth ia 
paraaraph (b) as a mesas of balancing the re-
quirement* of tslrness and due process oa ths 
oas head against ths public's interest ia ths 
efficient eeftdkatioa of ths enormous volume 
of wrongful imprisonment eases pending in th* 
Paraaraim (*>. Tuts paragraph governs all 
P«UUWUA claiming that a person has been 
wrongfully leotnined of personal liberty other 
than those specifically governed by psraarsph 
<i». It replaces psrseraph (0 of tho former nil*. 
seraph (b) of the presses rul* para-
(c) sndssvon ts simplify ths procedure 
ia assess corpus esses and provides for s 
of summary dismissal of frivolous 
claims. Thus, if it is apparent to tho court thst 
ths daim is "frivolous oa its fece", tho court 
mayumojsaa ordsr dismissing ths daim, which 
tsrminstes th* proceeding. Apart from thia sig» 
fa) is patterned after th* former rule, 
Paragraphs id) aad is) replace paragraph (b) 
of tho former mis. Ths commit***'! general 
purpose ia drafting these paragraphs wss ts 
sunpiiry and clarify *he requirements of the 
Paparooh (di Parseraph (d) replaoss para-
graph 'b^pofthe former rule. Thia paragraph 
deals generally with proroodinp far the un-
lawful uss of public office or corporate frss> 
chisas* As a general matter, th* attorney gen-
eral may seek relief oa grounds enumerated ia 
the paragraph. Aay other porssa, includine s 
governmental officer or entity not required to 
bo lepresemsd by tho attorney general nsy 
also seek relief under paragraph (d) if tho per-
son claims to bo entitled to aa office unlawfully 
held by another or if th* attorney pnersi foils 
to Mis a petition under paragraph (d) after re-
cstvtne notice of the person's daim. In allowing 
appropriate pvernmsatsl entities aad officers 
to proceed under this parseraph. ths ruls eiim-
i run** s procedural bamor thst previously pre-
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Richard Dee THOMAS, Defendant and Petitioner. 
No. 970049. 
May 22, 1998. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, William B. Bohling, J., of 
aggravated robbery. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
and certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, 
Russon, J., held that: (1) court commissioner could 
not constitutionally issue search warrant given that 
issuing search warrant was core judicial function 
involving ultimate judicial power, and (2) defendant 
inadequately briefed photo array issue. 
Reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded. 
West Headnoces 
[1] Certiorari <®=»63.1 
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews decision of 
Court of Appeals, not decision of trial court. 
[2] Certiorari <®=»64<1) 
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews Court of 
Appeals' decision for correctness and gives its 
conclusions of law no deference. 
[3] Officers and Public Employees <S=*43 
Under doctrine of "de facto authority/ actions 
performed by those without actual authority are 
validated when they are performed by one who, 
under the color of law, assumes to exercise official 
authority, is reputed to have it, and the community 
acquiesces accordingly. 
[4] Court Commissioners Qz*3 
[4] Courts <S=* 100(1) 
Instant decision, holding that court commissioner 
does not have authority to issue search warrant, is 
prospective, and any prior search warrant issued by 
commissioner is valid under de facto doctrine, 
except that present defendant would be given benefit 
of his victory, in making his constitutional 
challenge. Const. An. 8, § i; U.C.A.1953, 
78-3-31, 78-3-3l(6)(a). 
[5] Court Commissioners <3=»3 
Holding in Ohms prohibiting court commissioners 
from performing core judicial functions did not 
deinstitutionalize court commissioners given that 
court commissioners are still able to perform many 
important functions in assistance to courts such as 
conducting fact finding hearings, holding pretrial 
conferences, and making other recommendations to 
judges. Const. An. 8, § 1; U.C.A.1953, 78-3-31. 
[6] Coun Commissioners <©^3 
Issuance of search warrant is core judicial function, 
which court commissioners lack authority to 
perform, though statute purports to give such 
authority to magistrates, which term includes 
commissioners, given that issuing search warrant 
could not be characterized as permissible functions 
of commissioner of either recommendation to judge 
or other action reviewable by judge, and, when 
judge issues law enforcement order to search and 
seize, judge simultaneously exercises power and 
authority to enforce such order, and once armed 
with issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to 
search and seize at will. Const. An. 8, § 1; 
U.C. A. 1953, 77-1-3, 77-23-201, 78-3-31, 
78-3-3 l(6Xa). 
[7] Coun Commissioners <®^3 
Core judicial functions can be performed only by 
duly appointed judges, and not by coun 
commissioners, and thus, only duly appointed judges 
can issue search warrants. Const. An. 8, § 1. 
[8] Criminal Law «=» 1130(5) 
Due to defendant's lack of analysis, issue of whether 
trial coun erred in denying his motion to suppress a 
positive eyewitness identification made from suspect 
photo array was inadequately briefed, and thus, 
Coun of Appeals was justified in declining to 
address it. Rules App.Proc., Rule 24(a)(9). 
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[9] Criminal Law <®=* 1130(5) 
Reviewing court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed. Rules App.Proc., Rule 
24(a)(9). 
[10] Criminal Law <®=> 1130(5) 
While failure to cite to pertinent authority may not 
always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does 
so when the overall analysis of the issue is so 
tacking as to shift the burden of research and 
argument to the reviewing court. Rules App.Proc., 
Rule 24(a)(9). 
*300 Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
Bel-Ami Demontreux, Salt Lake City, for 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
RUSSON, Justice: 
We granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of 
Appeals' decision that our holding in Salt Lake City 
v. Ohms, 881 P 2d 844 (Utah 1994) (prohibiting 
court commissioners from performing core judicial 
functions), does not apply to the issuance of a search 
warrant by a court commissioner. We are also 
asked to review the court of appeals' refusal to 
address defendant's claim that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress a positive eyewitness 
identification made from a suspect photo array. 
The court of appeals' refusal was based upon 
inadequate briefing. State v. Thomas, No. 
960170-CA, slip op. (Ct.App. November 29, 1996) 
(memorandum decision), cert, granted, 937 P.2d 
136 (Utah 1997). We reverse as to the applicability 
of Ohms and affirm as to the refusal to address the 
photo array issue. 
FACTS 
On the night of June 30, 1993, an armed robbery 
was committed at a fast food restaurant in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. At gun point, the assailant ordered 
the manager to put all the money into a bag and to 
accompany him to the parking lot. The manager 
was then released, and the assailant ran away. 
Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived on the 
scene and began their investigation of the robbery. 
As pan of their investigation, they received a lead 
on a suspect who was reported to be in a nearby 
apartment. The suspect was defendant Richard Dee 
Thomas. When the police arrived at the apartment, 
a confrontation ensued with Thomas. The officers 
forced entry into the apartment but retreated after 
Thomas threatened to kill a hostage. [FN1] Then. 
while some officers guarded the apartment, others 
went to obtain a search warrant. 
FN I. It later turned out that there was no hostage. 
During the early morning of July 1, 1993, Third 
District Court Commissioner Frances M. Palacios 
issued a search warrant. After obtaining the search 
warrant, the police officers returned to the scene. 
Shortly thereafter, Thomas surrendered, and the 
apartment was searched. During the search, the 
police seized evidence linking Thomas to the crime. 
On July 2, 1993, the manager of the restaurant was 
shown a photo array of six men and identified 
Thomas as the man who committed the robbery. 
During interrogation and after Thomas waived his 
Miranda rights, Thomas confessed to committing the 
armed robbery. On July 6, 1993, the State filed an 
information against Thomas, charging him with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Thomas 
pleaded not guilty. 
Prior to trial, Thomas moved to suppress evidence 
obtained during the search. Thomas cited Salt Lake 
City v. Ohms and argued that the issuance of a 
search warrant constitutes a fundamental court 
function and thus the search and seizure were 
unconstitutional in that the court commissioner who 
issued the search warrant lacked the authority to do 
so. This motion was denied. Thomas also moved to 
suppress eyewitness identification, arguing, inter 
alia, that the photo array of the six men was unduly 
suggestive. This motion was also denied. On 
August 4, 199S, a jury convicted Thomas as 
charged. 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Thomas 
asserted, inter alia, that the trial conn erred when it 
denied Thomas's motion *301 to suppress evidence 
and his motion to suppress eyewitness identification. 
In an unpublished memorandum decision, the court 
of appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings. 
Thomas then petitioned this court for certiorari 
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review, and we granted the petition. 
ANALYSIS 
[t][2J "On certiorari, we review the decision of the 
coun of appeals, not the decision of the trial court." 
State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
"We review the coun of appeals' decision for 
correctness and give its conclusions of law no 
deference." Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 
P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997). 
I 
The first issue we address is whether the court of 
appeals erred when it held that Salt Lake City v. 
Ohms, 881 P 2d 844 (Utah 1994), did not apply to 
the issuance of a search warrant. Before the court 
of appeals, Thomas argued that coun commissioners 
do not have the authority to issue search warrants. 
In a rather scant summary disposition of the issue, 
the coun of appeals disagreed, simply stating: 
Thomas relies on Salt Lake City v. Ohms for the 
proposition that "the Utah Supreme Court, on 
August 18, 1994, held that Utah Code Annotated § 
78-3-31 (1992), that gave to Utah coun 
commissioners their powers was unconstitutional.' 
In addition to having prospective application, 
Thomas's reading of Ohms is too broad and does 
not apply to the issuance of a search warrant. 
Thomas, slip op. at 1 (citation omitted). 
Although the coun of appeals should have 
elaborated to make its ruling more clear, die essence 
of its holding appears' to be that (1) Ohms had 
prospective application and therefore was 
inapplicable to Thomas's case because die search 
warrant pre-dated our ruling in Ohms; (2) 
Thomas's assenion that coun commissioners have 
no power was too broad a reading of Ohms since 
only the exercise of core judicial functions by coun 
commissions was prohibited; and (3) Ohms did not 
apply because die issuance of a search warrant is not 
a core judicial (unction. We address these holdings 
in turn. 
[3] In Ohms, Ohms had been charged with giving 
false or misleading information to a police officer, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City 
Ordinance § 11.04.100. Ohms was tried, convicted, 
and sentenced by a coun commissioner pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-3l(6)(a) (1992). [FN2] 
Ohms appealed to this coun, arguing that a coun 
commissioner did not have the authority to enter a 
final judgment of conviction and impose sentence, as 
such was an unconstitutional exercise of ultimate 
judicial power. We agreed and held that coun 
commissioners cannot exercise a judge's ultimate 
judicial power or, in other words, cannot perform 
core judicial functions. In so holding, we found 
significant the fact that "[cjoun commissioners are 
employees of the judiciary, not duly appointed 
judges," and that commissioners are not subject to 
the "constitutional checks and balances'* to which 
duly appointed judges are subject. Ohms, 881 P.2d 
at 851. We thus found section 78-3-3 i(6)(a) 
unconstitutional because it delegated the core 
judicial functions of entering final judgment and 
imposing sentence to a coun commissioner. Under 
the doctrine of de facto authority, [FN3] we 
validated die past actions of coun commissioners 
who had engaged in die unconstitutional exercise of 
core judicial functions. 
FN2. Utah Code Aim. § 78-3-3 l(6)(a) (1992) 
stated: 
The coun commissioner may accept pleas of guilty 
or no contest, impose sentence, and enter final 
judgment in misdemeanor cases. Upon the 
informed consent of the defendant, the coun 
commissioner may conduct a jury or nonjury 
misdemeanor trial in accordance with the law. 
Upon conviction, the commissioner may impose 
sentence and enter final judgment. The judgment 
entered by the commissioner shall be the final 
judgment of the coun for all purposes, including 
appeal. 
FN3. Under this doctrine, actions performed by 
those without actual authority are validated when 
they are performed by one who, under the color of 
law, " assumes to exercise official authority, is 
reputed to have it, and the community acquiesces 
accordingly/ " Ohms, 881 P.2d at 854 (quoting 
Hussey v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24, 25 L.Ed. 314 
(1878)). 
•302 A. Prospective Application 
[4] Given only die coun of appeals' conclusive 
statement, we assume that it agreed with die State's 
argument that Thomas was precluded from 
challenging commissioner actions because we 
limited Ohms to prospective application and the 
search warrant was issued some founeen months 
prior to Ohms. Indeed, a review of the record 
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
961 P.2d 299 
(Cite as: 96i P.2d 299, «302) 
reveals that the search warrant was issued on July i, 
1993, over thirteen months prior to the Ohms 
decision. However, while we stated in Ohms that 
"actions taken by commissioners in the past are not 
subject to challenge since court commissioners in 
those cases acted with de facto authority/ we 
declined to apply the de facto doctrine to Ohms as 
he had "sustained the burden of attacking an 
unconstitutional statute." To hold otherwise and 
deprive an appellant of "the fruits of victory" would 
have the effect of "discouraging challenges to 
statutes of questionable validity." Ohms, 881 P.2d 
at 854-35. In the case before us, by arguing that 
the issuance of a search warrant is a core judicial 
function, Thomas, like Ohms, is attacking the 
constitutionality of a court commissioner's exercise 
of power. Thus, if Thomas sustains this burden, 
and we hold that he does, then the de facto doctrine 
would not apply to him for the same reasons it did 
not apply to Ohms. As in Ohms, our decision today 
is prospective, and any search warrants issued by 
court commissioners in the past are valid, as they 
were issued with de facto authority. Id. 
B. The Power of Court Commissioners 
[5] Thomas argued before the court of appeals that 
our decision in Ohms held section 78-3-31 
unconstitutional and thus "deconstitutionalized court 
commissioners." The court of appeals dismissed 
this argument as going beyond what was actually 
held in Ohms. The court of appeals is correct. In 
Ohms, we clearly stated that section 78-3-31 
violated the Utah Constitution "to the extent that it 
purports to vest ultimate judicial power of courts of 
record in persons who have not been duly appointed 
as article VIII judges." Id. at 835 (emphasis added). 
We also acknowledged that court commissioners 
"may perform many important functions in 
assistance to courts" such as conducting fact finding 
hearings, holding pretrial conferences, and making 
other recommendations to judges. In fact, we 
specifically stated that "our decision in no way 
affects the authority and functions that court 
commissioners have enjoyed for over thirty years 
and will undoubtedly continue to enjoy in the 
future." Id. at 851-52 n. 17. Nowhere in Ohms did 
we " deinstitutionalize" the court commissioner 
system. 
C. Issuance of a Search Warrant as a Core Judicial 
Function 
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim 
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The court of appeals also held that Ohms did not 
apply because the issuance of a search warrant is not 
a core judicial function. This is a question of first 
impression. 
In Ohms, we stated that core judicial functions 
include (I) " 'the power to hear and determine 
controversies between adverse parties and questions 
in litigation,' " (2) " 'the authority to hear and 
determine justiciable controversies,' " (3) " the 
authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or 
order,' " and (4) "all powers that are necessary to 
protect die fundamental integrity of the judicial 
branch.' " Id. at 849 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). Core judicial functions do not include 
functions that are generally designed to "assist" 
courts, such as conducting fact finding hearings, 
holding pretrial conferences, and making 
recommendations to judges. In these instances, the 
commissioners' actions are reviewable by adjudge; 
thus, ultimate judicial power remains with the judge. 
Id. at 85 In. 17. 
[6] Turning to the present case, it is well 
established that a search warrant is an order. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1995) (defining 
search warrant as "an order issued by a magistrate 
in die name of the state and directed to a peace 
officer," describing the search and property to be 
seized); 1933 Revised Statutes of Utah § 105-54-1 
(stating that "[a] search warrant is an order in 
writing, in the name of the state, signed by a 
magistrate and directed to a peace officer, 
commanding him to search for personal property 
and bring it before die magistrate"), quoted in Allen 
v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242, 247-48 
(1943); see also 79 *303 C.J.S. Searches and 
Seizures § 128 (1995). When a judge issues to law 
enforcement an order to search and seize, the judge 
simultaneously exercises die power and authority to 
enforce such an order, because once armed with an 
issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to search 
and seize at will. Thus, because a search warrant is 
an order and die issuer possesses the authority to 
enforce the order, die issuance of a search warrant 
is a core judicial function, which commissioners 
lack the authority to perform. 
This holding is buttressed by the fact that the right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
embodied in the Utah and United States 
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Constitutions [FN4J is one of the most fundamental 
and cherished rights we possess. See, e.g., 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758, 105 S.Ct. 
1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (The Fourth 
Amendment protects ... 'the right to be let alone-
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.* " (quoting Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 
L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); 
Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 
S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) ("The Fourth 
Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right 
of the people which is basic to a free society.' " 
(quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 
S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949))); Harris v. 
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 9i 
L.Ed. 1399 (1947) ("This Court has consistently 
asserted that the rights of privacy and personal 
security protected by the Fourth Amendment'... are 
to be regarded as of the very essence of 
constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty of them 
is as important and as imperative as are the 
guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the 
individual citizen ....' " (quoting Gouled v. United 
States, 255 U.S. 298, 304. 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 
647 (1921))), overruled in part by Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 
L.Ed.2d 683 (1969). Given the magnitude of the 
right at risk when a search warrant is issued, we 
have no difficulty in granting the issuance of a 
search warrant core function status. 
FN4. The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which is practically identical to 
article I. section" 14 of the Utah Constitution, 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shaU not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oadi or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized, 
[7] The State proffers two arguments as to why 
court commissioners have the authority to issue 
search warrants. First, the Stale claims that 
commissioner authority to issue search warrants 
stems from their status as magistrates, who possess 
the clear statutory grant of power to issue search 
warrants. Section 77-1-3 does define a magistrate as 
"a justice or judge of a court of record or not of 
record or a commissioner of such a court appointed 
Copr. O West 2000 No Claim 
in accordance with Section 78-3-31/ and section 
78-7-l7.5(l)(c) does vest authority in magistrates to 
"issue ... warrants of search." However, as we 
have outlined above, Ohms held that under the Utah 
Constitution core judicial functions can be 
performed only by duly appointed judges. Thus, in 
accordance with our holding today, only duly 
appointed judges can issue search warrants. Court 
commissioners are not judges, and thus they cannot 
issue search warrants. Any attempt by the 
legislature to statutorily confer the power to issue 
search warrants upon court commissioners would be 
null and void as a violation of the Utah Constitution. 
We do not hold the above-stated statutes 
unconstitutional, however, because section 
78-7-17.5(1) clearly grants magistrates the power to 
issue search warrants, "(ejxeept as otherwise 
provided by law." 
Second, the State argues that the issuance., of a 
search warrant is not a core judicial function 
involving the exercise of ultimate judicial power but 
rather involves a nonadjudicative preliminary matter 
that simply assists the court in moving die case 
along. Certainly, many actions are capable of 
"assisting" courts, including tbt performance of core 
judicial functions. Thus, determining whether a 
particular action assists a court does not end the 
inquiry. As we have noted, functions that 
commissioners can constitutionally *304 perform are 
those that constitute recommendations or other 
functions that are reviewable by a judge. Issuing a 
search warrant cannot be characterized as either a 
recommendation or an action that is reviewable by a 
judge. The commissioner in this case did not 
recommend to the judge that the warrant be issued 
but rather issued it herself. Similarly, the decision 
to issue was not subject to review by a judge with 
the possibility of disallowing the search. Rather, 
the order to search and seize was issued and then 
executed immediately thereafter. Furthermore, 
while the issuance of a search warrant is a 
"preliminary" decision when looking at a criminal 
prosecution as a whole, it is a final decision as to 
whether a search will occur. Thus, while issuing a 
search warrant does not rise to the level of finality 
as entering judgment and imposing sentence, as was 
disallowed in Ohms, it is sufficiently final to 
establish it as a core judicial function. We thus hold 
that because the issuance of a search warrant is a 
core judicial function, which cannot be performed 
by a court commissioner, the court of appeals erred 
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when it held that Ohms did not apply. 
Thomas also objects to a court commissioner 
presiding over his first appearance. He argues that, 
similar to issuing a search warrant, presiding over a 
first appearance is a core judicial function that 
commissioners lack the authority to perform. 
However, Thomas fails in his brief to identify or 
describe this hearing or discuss what the 
commissioner's actions were and how these actions 
constituted the exercise of core judicial functions. 
Thomas cited only to the Third Circuit Court's 
docket sheet stating that a first appearance took 
place. A review of the record reveals no further 
evidence of the first appearance. It does show, 
however, that Thomas's preliminary hearing was 
held before Circuit Court Judge Phillip K. Palmer 
and that it was he who bound Thomas over for trial 
in Third District Court. Rule 24(aX9) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant's 
argument to contain the "reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented ... with citations 
to the ... parts of the record relied on." Thomas 
has failed to comply with these requirements. His 
brief is totally inadequate, and therefore, we decline 
to address this issue. 
II 
[81 The second issue we address is whether the 
court of appeals erred when it declined to address 
Thomas's claim that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress a positive eyewitness 
identification made from a suspect photo array 
because Thomas failed to adequately brief the issue. 
The court of appeals stated: 
Thomas ignores several decisions addressing 
proper challenges to photo amy cases* See Stale 
v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah 1989). 
Because Thomas fails to adequately brief this 
argument, it is without merit and we decline to 
address it. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) 
(requiring "citations to the authorities [and] 
statutes ... relied on"). 
Thomas, slip op. at 3. 
A review of the record reveals that Thomas devoted 
four pages of his brief before the court of appeals to 
his photo array argument. However, almost three 
of these pages consisted of direct quotes from the 
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trial transcript. On the basis of the trial testimony, 
Thomas then asserted that the photo array was 
overly suggestive. His only reference to any legal 
authority is contained in the bald assertions that the 
identification also taints any other identification of 
Mr. Thomas in violation of due process under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. The overly suggestive photo 
array also violates Art. I, § 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution (Due process); see also State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
These statements concluded his argument. 
[9] It is well established that a reviewing court will 
not address arguments that are not adequately 
briefed. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 368 n. 5 
(Utah 1995) (refusing to address defendants state 
due process argument where argument entailed only 
superficial statement concerning Utah's unique 
history and reference to another part of defendant*s 
•305 brief); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 
(Utah 1989) (declining to rule on issue where 
defendant's brief "wholly lack(ed] legal analysis and 
authority to support his argument"); State v. 
Amicooe, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) 
(declining to rule on separation of powers argument 
where argument was not supported by any legal 
analysis or authority). 
In deciding whether an argument has been 
adequately briefed, we look to the standard set forth 
in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This rule states that the argument in the 
appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and 
reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented ... with citations to the authorities, statutes 
and parts of the record relied on." Implicitly, rule 
24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority 
but development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority. We have 
previously stated that this court is not" a depository 
in which the appealing party may dump the burden 
of argument and research.' " State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. 
Opsahl, 92 m.App.3d 1087, 48 Ill.Dec. 510, 511, 
416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). 
[10] In his brief to the court of appeals, Thomas did 
cite to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution, to article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution, and to the case of State v. 
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Ramirez. However , this is all he did \ i lalysis of 
what this authority requires and o f how the facts of 
Thomas ' s case satisfy these requirements was 
whol ly lacking. The court of appeals also noted, 
"Thomas ignores several decis ions addressing proper 
chal lenges to photo array cases ." Thomas , sl ip op . 
at 3 . While fa.ilu.rc to cite to pertinent authority may 
not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it 
does so when the overall analysis o f the issue is so 
lacking as to shift the burden o f research and 
argument to the reviewing court. Because o f 
T h o m a s ' s lack o f analysis , the photo array issue was 
inadequately briefed and the court o f appeals was 
justified in declining to address it 
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Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals 
holding that Salt Lake City v. Ohms does not apply 
to the issuance of a search warrant. Issuing a 
search warrant is a core judicial function involving 
ultimate judicial power. We remand the case to the 
court of appeals for a determination as to whether 
the trial court1 s failure to suppress evidence obtained 
from the search constituted reversible error. We 
further affirm the court of appeals' holding that 
Thomas inadequately briefed the photo array issue. 
H 0 W E C J ^ D U R H A M f Associate CJ and 
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur in 
Justice RUSSONs opinion. 
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Before J udges aencr* . *ngs, and D '* 
DAVIS, Judge: • ' '•" : . ".• 
This case is before us oa remand from ^ae Utah Supreme 
Court, SSA State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998), The sole 
issue is "whether the trial court's failure to suppress evidence 
obtained from*the [illegal] search constituted reversible error." 
id. at 3 0-5 We ho3 d that i t does not 
B e c a u a e tj i e invalid search amounts to a v i olat ion 
federally protected constitutional right, "we will aff ... 
defendant's conviction only if we can say, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that defendant would still have been convicted . . . even 
if the trial court had not admitted the improperly seized 
evidence.11 stata v. Sinovaii. 909 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) . The evidence seized pursuant to the search was the 
baseball cap, sunglasses, gun, and bank bags with some coin 
wrappers and gift certificates. Had this evidence been 
suppressed, the jury had before it a positive and unequivocal 
eyewitness identification from the store manager who had spent 
several minutes studying defendant's face while in the store, a t::! 
had come face-to-face with defendant several times while 
defendant forced the manager across the store parking lot. A 
neighbor immediately next-door to the apartment at which 
defendant had been staying directed the police to the apartment. 
< ! ! !: !, > 
Upon arrival, the police were able to see defendant inside and 
confirmed the neighbor's report that a man matching the 
description given by the Kentucky Fried Chicken employees was 
there. The police guarded the apartment until defendant emerged. 
Most importantly, defendant's voluntary and uncoerced confession 
that he had committed the robbery was also before the jury. 
Comparing the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant with 
the overall strength of the prosecution's case, we hold that the 
admission of the seized evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt because "the evidence that was erroneously* admitted did 
not significantly contribute to defendant's conviction and other 
properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly established his guilt." 
£2& Genovesi. 909 P.2d at 923.2 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
t<Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1. We note the exemplary conduct of the police in this matter 
and that the "error" could not have been reasonably anticipated 
by either the police or the trial court. 
2. Because of our disposition, we do not reach the State's 
argument that exclusion of the seized evidence is an 
inappropriate remedy. Se^ state v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 
1989). We find defendant's jurisdictional arguments, including 
those styled as a "Motion/Memorandum for Appointment of Counsel," 
without merit and decline to address them, gee id.. and issuance 
of this decision renders defendant's "Motion for an Expedited 
Decision of Appeal" moot. Lastly, even if we assume defendant's 
"Affidavit for Change of Venue[] and Prejudice" is a proper 
pleading, it is without merit and we do not reach the issues 
raised therein. See id. 
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Addendum D 
ADDENDUM L 
(Supreme Court summary alilrmaiicc, Ma> 14,, J J J; 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH ^ ^ . ^ ^
 IOT 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Richard Dee Thomas, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
REMrnrn^ft-- c^ 
No. 960044 
The State of Utah, Frances M. 
Palacios, Henry Glaetka, et ah, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
No 950900*14 . 
The judgment appealed is summarily ailirmea on the coui fs o J t i motion as the 
issues raised are so unsubstantial as not to merit further proceedings or consideration by 
this court. Utah R App. P. 10(a)(2). It is noted that the same issues are raised in Thomas' 
direct appea 1 of his crimina I conviction, and it is clear that extraordinary relief does not lie, 
since there is another plain, speedy and adequate available to Thomas, which he 
has already pursued. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B. 
Ordci 
Remittitur Issued: May I1!,, 1 ' ft 
Record: None 
'0 
Addendun 
ADDENDUM ^ 
(I hslnrl Cowl Mcmuiunduin I Vrision 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDIC AL DISTRICT 
III AMD FOR SALT LAKI COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DEB THOMAS, 
Petitioner, 
•llll l l l! 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 1 , 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASH MO. 950900814 
This matter, brought under former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
65B(b) f has a rather long and complicated history. The Cour t in i Ill II 
not attempt B h £ storical review :: f th i s il I: il s i .dequately 
set In the Memorandum: :1 in Support despondent9 s Motion I mi 
Dismiss, c! ,1 i ::I petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition In additi „ 
the petition itself il • rather rambling il i i i isture 
difficult to identify III Il Il of the issues. However, the Court feels 
that the issues have been adequately identified :i n the Memoranda 
with this Motion to Dismiss. 
Respondent's Motion -smiss, witii the accompany! ng 
M e m o r a n u * iiiiiii Il HIIIIII H P II" n i l I III I" i mi ' i l 
time given to the Cour * - • picture of the issues I'he matter 
has been complicated further by virtue of the fart that I IIIII 
D i s i j u d g e s j u d g e III1! '."i ^ v i e w e d IIIm i "a. i ni1 ft" 
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and have for one reason or another been required to recuse 
themselves. 
Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing before the Court in 
this matter. The Court has made a determination, however, after 
reviewing respondent's Motion to Dismiss, together with the 
thorough and well-prepared Memoranda filed by both parties in this 
case in connection with the Motion that there are no factual issues 
in dispute, and that the Court can rule in this case as a matter of 
law. 
It appears that petitioner's complaints center on pretrial 
matters that have either been resolved on appeal, could have been 
resolved on appeal, or are of such a nature that they would not 
invalidate the valid conviction and sentencing of this defendant, 
and accordingly the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss. 
Petitioner argues that the search warrant issued in this 
matter by a Court Commissioner was invalid. That issue was decided 
on appeal, with a determination that the search warrant was invalid 
as it was issued by a Commissioner, but the court ruled that the 
failure to suppress the evidence obtained from the search did not 
constitute reversible error. This matter has been raised and dealt 
with on appeal. 
Petitioner's Memorandum challenges the arrest warrant and the 
Information charging the defendant• First, the Court notes that 
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these issues were not properly raised in petitioner's Petition. 
These are also issues that could have been raised on appeal. In 
addition, there was a valid arrest warrant as to some unrelated 
parole violations that had been issued for petitioner, and thus 
petitioner was already in the custody of the State. Lastly, these 
irregularities are cured by a subsequent valid conviction. See, 
gUt? Vt QVtfrg, 837 P.2d 565 (Utah App. 1992). 
It appears that petitioner may also be arguing that he was 
arrested without an arrest warrant and did not thereafter receive 
a probable cause determination on the arrest warrant. Again, 
however, there was an outstanding warrant for petitioner's arrest 
for parole violation. When petitioner was arrested, the booking 
Information shows that he was arrested and booked for parole 
violation, as well as for the new charge of Aggravated Robbery. 
Again, however, this preliminary matter, even if deemed to be an 
irregularity, is cured by defendant's later conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has ruled that "although a 
suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause 
for the confinement, the conviction will not be vacated on the 
ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a 
determination of probable cause." Gerstein v. Pucrh, 420 U.S. 103, 
95 S.Ct. 854 (1975). See also, State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 
(Utah 1985). 
*; •' <fC 
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Petitioner has also raised in a very vague way a challenge to 
the parole revocation hearing. However, the specifics of his claim 
are unclear, but he appears to be challenging the Board's warrant 
of arrest, the Board's credit for time served ruling, and the 
timeliness of the parole revocation hearing. 
The Court is of the opinion that the argument that the Board's 
warrant was invalid is without merit. Secondly, this Court would 
not review a decision by the Board of Pardons refusing to grant a 
prisoner credit for time served, as that is within the discretion 
of the Board. Lastly, the petitioner's argument regarding the 
timeliness of the Board of Pardons revocation hearing is without 
merit as it appears that the petitioner specifically waived his 
right to a pre-revocation hearing by signing the waiver of pre-
revocation hearing. Petitioner cannot now complain that he did not 
have a pre-revocation hearing in a timely fashion. If petitioner 
is arguing that his full revocation hearing was untimely, then he 
has provided nothing to the Court upon which it could base a 
decision. 
Petitioner claims for the first time in the Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Motion that he is entitled to relief by virtue of 
the fact that he did not receive a trial within 120 days of his 
first appearance in court. This argument fails first for the 
reason that it was not raised or addressed in his original or 
*>v:«s;> 
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Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief. It was not listed by 
the Court as those issues to be addressed in the hearing before the 
Court on June 28, 2000. It is raised for the first time here in 
response to the respondent's Motion to Dismiss. It must also fail 
because it is an issue that could have been raised and addressed on 
appeal, but was not. Lastly, it must fail because the record 
before the Court makes it quite clear that the delay in bringing 
petitioner to trial was largely of his own making. (See, 
respondent's "Response to Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss Petition for Extraordinary Relief p. 12, et seq., for 
a summary of the record in this case pertaining to this issue.) 
The Court also notes that petitioner on two occasions requested a 
continuance of his trial, and specifically waived his right to a 
speedy trial. 
Petitioner argues that his conviction is invalid by virtue of 
the fact that he did not receive a preliminary hearing within ten 
days of his arrest. The record shows that the Information was 
filed against petitioner on July 6, 1993. A preliminary hearing 
was scheduled for July 13, 1993. The preliminary hearing was 
rescheduled numerous times at the request of petitioner and 
petitioner's counsel due to numerous changes in petitioner's 
counsel and for other reasons. In addition, the petitioner waived 
his right to a preliminary hearing, however, the Court proceeded 
"V3S4 
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with the preliminary hearing on December 14, 1993, and the 
petitioner was bound over. The petitioner has not demonstrated to 
this Court that the preliminary hearing was not continued for good 
cause. Petitioner's argument that the bindover was invalid, since 
it was done by a Circuit Court judge rather than a magistrate is 
without merit. 
The Court determines that the grounds relied upon by Mr. 
Thomas in his Petition for Extraordinary Relief are without merit, 
and can be disposed of as a matter of law as stated above, and the 
respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
Counsel for respondent is to prepare an appropriate Order. 
Dated this Cr c^day of February, 2001. 
FRANK G. NC 
DISTRICT C0URT JUDGE 
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KAILIMq CIRTIfICATB 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the following, 
thisl^ day of February, 2001: 
Richard Dee Thomas 
Pro se 
P.O. BOX 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Karl R. Cannon 
Attorney for Petitioner 
10150 S. Centennial Parkway, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 1909 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1909 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondents 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
! ' '.' J S 
Addendum F 
ADDENDUM F 
(District Court Findings, Conclusions and Order 
of Dismissal of Petition) 
Erin Riley, # 8375 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARX L. SHURTLEFF, # 4666 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 950900814 
j Judge FRANK G. NOEL 
This matter comes before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. The Court has 
carefully considered the pleadings submitted in this matter, including but not limited to, the Petition, 
Motion to Dismiss, Response, and Reply, and now being ftilly advised in the premises, enters the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 4, 1995, a jury convicted petitioner of one count of aggravated robbery. On 
December 4, 1995, petitioner was sentenced to five years to life in prison. 
r n r i 
2:: 1 iTsii r;i 2- uo 
s:.: .;.rr 
hOt^u^ 
2. Petitioner appealed his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in 
an unpublished memorandum decision. State v. Thomas, No 960170-CA (Utah App. Nov. 29, 
1996)(unpublished). 
3. The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari in case #970049. The Supreme Court 
reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998). 
4. As to the portion of petitioner's case which was remanded, on February 25,19991 in 
a memorandum decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction incase #961170-C A. 
The Utah Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 21, 1999. 
5. On February 7,1995 (prior to his conviction and subsequent appeal), petitioner filed 
a petition for extraordinary relief. He filed an amended petition on March 27,1995. 
6 The case was assigned to several district court judges who successively recused 
themselves. 
7. Through various proceedings, it appears that the petition was dismissed and 
reinstated several times. 
8. On February 2,2000, the court entered a minute entry which stated: "It appears to the 
Court then that this matter has been dismissed with prejudice, and accordingly, the Court will take 
no further action in this matter as the case is deemed to be closed by the Court/' 
9. Through new counsel, petitioner filed a motion to vacate the minute entry. 
10. The minute entry was vacated and respondent was ordered to file a response to the 
petition. 
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11. Respondent responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss, to which petitioner filed his 
Reply. 
12. Petitioner argued that the search warrant issued by a Court Commissioner was invalid. 
That issue was raised and dealt with on appeal. 
13. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act states that a person is not eligible for relief upon 
any ground that "was raised or addressed... on appeal" or that "could have been but was not raised 
... on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-i06 (l)(b) & (c) (1996). 
14. Petitioner challenged the arrest warrant and the Information charging him. These 
issues were not properly raised in the petition. In addition, the allegations concerning the arrest 
warrant and Information could have been raised on appeal. 
15. Also, there was a valid arrest warrant as to some unrelated parole violations that had 
been issued for petitioner. Therefore, petitioner was already in the custody of the State under the 
parole warrant. 
16. Petitioner challenged the Parole Board's warrant of arrest, the Board's ruling 
concerning credit for time served, and the timeliness of his parole revocation hearing. 
17. Petitioner specifically waived his right to a pre-revocation hearing by signing a 
waiver of pre-revocation hearing. 
18. A decision as to whether to grant a prisoner credit for time served is within the 
discretion of the Board. 
-3-
19. Petitioner has provided no information to the Court upon which it could base a 
decision as to whether his full revocation hearing was untimely. 
20. Petitioner claimed for the first time in his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion 
to Dismiss that he was entitled to relief because he did not receive a trial within 120 days of his first 
appearance in court. This argument was not raised or addressed in his original or amended petition. 
In addition, this claim is an issue which could have been raised and addressed on appeal. 
21. The record makes it clear that the delay in bringing petitioner to trial was largely 
of his own making. For instance, on two occasions, petitioner requested continuance of trial, and 
specifically waived his right to speedy trial. 
22. Petitioner argued that his conviction was invalid because he did not receive a 
preliminary hearing within ten days of his arrest 
23. An Information was filed against petitioner on July 6,1993. A preliminary hearing 
was scheduled for July 13,1993. Thus, the preliminary hearing was originally schedule within ten 
days of petitioner's arrest, however the hearing was rescheduled numerous times at the request of 
petitioner and his counsel. 
24. In addition, petitioner waived his right to a preliminary hearing, however, the Court 
proceeded with the hearing on December 14, 1993. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the following: 
-4-
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There are no factual issues in dispute, therefore, the Court can rule in this case as a 
matter of law. 
2. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996), petitioner is not entitled to relief upon 
his claim that the search warrant was invalid, because this claim was raised and dealt with on appeal. 
3. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claims challenging the arrest warrant and'the 
Information because these issues were not properly raised in his petition. 
4. In addition, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996), petitioner is not entitled to 
relief upon his claims challenging the arrest warrant and Information because these issues could have 
been raised on appeal. 
5. Petitioner is also not entitled to relief upon his claim challenging the arrest warrant 
because he was already in the custody of the State under the parole warrant. 
6. Petitioner is also not entitled to relief upon his claims challenging the arrest warrant 
and Information because any irregularity was cured by petitioner's subsequent valid conviction 
beyond a reasonable doubt 
7. Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that the Parole Board's warrant was 
invalid, because his argument that the Parole warrant was invalid is without merit. 
8. Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that he did not have a timely pre-
revocation hearing because he specifically waived his right to a pre-revocation hearing. 
-5-
9. Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim regarding the Board's ruling 
concerning credit for time served, because this Court may not review a decision by the Board of 
Pardons refusing to grant a prisoner credit for time served, as that is within the discretion of the 
Board. 
10. Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to any claim that his full revocation hearing was 
untimely, because he provided nothing to the Court upon which it could base a decision concerning 
the timeliness of the full revocation hearing. 
11. Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that he did not receive a trial within 
120 days because this argument was not raised or addressed in his original or amended petition. 
12. In addition, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996), petitioner is not entitled to 
relief upon his claim that he did not receive a trial within 120 days because this argument could have 
been raised on appeal. 
13. Petitioner is also not entitled to relief as to his claim that he did not receive a trial 
within 120 days because his own actions were the cause of the delay, and the disposition period must 
be extended by the amount of time during which the prisoner himself creates the delay. 
14. Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that he did not receive a preliminary 
hearing with ten days of his arrest, because the hearing was continued at the request of petitioner and 
his counsel, and because petitioner has not demonstrated that any continuances were not for good 
cause. 
-6-
15. Petitioner is not entitled to relief as to his claim that his bindover to District Court 
was invalid, since it was done by a Circuit Court judge rather than a magistrate, because this claim 
is without merit. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby GRANTS Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
and ORDERS that the petition is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
DATED this aL3- day o n 
BY THE COURT: 
JNORABLE FRANK G. NKJL' 
Judge, Third Judicial District Ca r^t ^ t " * ^ ' ' *•' 
.7-
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted 
March 9, 2001 by: 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
C/2sCsr\J KAJLL*. 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Karl R. Cannon 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of March, 2001,1 mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to: 
Karl R. Cannon 
Clayton, Howarth & Cannon, P.C. 
10150 South Centennial Parkway, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 1909 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1909 
<2z*^y £*Jt ££. 
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Third Judicial oil! , , 
AUG 2 3 2001 
Deputy' 
Erin Riley, # 8375 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, # 4666 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD DEE THOMAS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case No. 950900814 
Judge FRANK G. NOEL 
For the reasons stated in the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and its 
Memorandum Decision entered in this matter, the Court hereby ORDERS that the Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice. 
DATED thi day of MarcO; 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE TRANK G. 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court 
Proposed Order Dismissing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief submitted 
March 9, 2001 by: 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARX L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Z^^^ KiJLe 4. 
Erin Riley 
Assistant Attorney Gem 
Attorneys for Respondent 
eray 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Karl R. Cannon 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the y aav of March, 2001,1 mailed, postage pre-paid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing [Proposed] ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF to: 
Karl R. Cannon 
Clayton, Howarth & Cannon, P.C. 
10150 South Centennial Parkway, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 1909 
Sandy, Utah 84091-1909 
fec^^ fcdjJLp, 
-3-
Addendum G 
ADDENDUM G 
(Timeline) 
A review of the file and docket shows the following timeline: 
7-6-93 Information filed. 
7-7-93 Petitioner referred to LDA. 
7-13-93 Defense attorney Patrick Anderson to represent petitioner. 
8-25-93 Petitioner wishes to fire counsel. Motion by Anderson to 
withdraw is granted. 
9-1 -93 Case sent to conflict attorney. 
9-7-93 New counsel is L. Clark Donaldson. 
9-27-93 Petitioner fires defense counsel Donaldson and waived speedy 
hearing (preliminary hearing) due to firing of Donaldson and 
prior counsel. Donaldson to notify LDA for appointment of 
alternate counsel. 
11 -2-93 Continuance - new counsel is James Haskins. 
11 -23-93 Petitioner files motion for new counsel. 
12-06-93 Defense attorney Haskins withdraws. Petitioner is informed 
that each time he fired another attorney, that time was 
stayed on his 120 day detainer. Preliminary hearing set for 
12-14-93. 
12-14-93 New counsel is Earl Xaiz. Petitioner expresses dissatisfaction 
with counsel. Court refuses to disqualify counsel and proceeds 
with preliminary hearing. Petitioner is bound over to district 
court. Arraignment is set for 1-3-94. 
12-16-93 Information filed in District Court. 
12-17-93 Arraignment re-scheduled for 1 -10-94. Defense counsel Xaiz 
files motion to withdraw. 
1 -10-94 Petitioner's motion for new counsel is granted. Arraignment 
continued to 2-7-94. 
3-18-94 Arraignment reset to 3-28-94. 
3-29-94 Court requests LDA to appoint new counsel. Arraignment reset 
to 4-18-94. 
4-18-94 Arraignment continued to 4-25-94 so defense counsel can be 
present. 
4-25-94 Felony Arraignment before Judge John Rokich. New counsel is 
Kevin Kurumada. Trial set for 8-2-94 
7-12-94 Stipulated motion to continue trial granted. Scheduling 
conference set for 8-1-94. 
8-1 -94 Affidavit of defendant filed to have jury trial vacated and 
motions heard. 
8-22-94 Defense counsel Kuramada filed motion to withdraw. 
9-12-94 Kuramada's motion to withdraw is granted. Court asks LDA to 
appoint new counsel. 
10-14-94 Petitioner's motion to dismiss on grounds that statute of 
limitations has run and that he was not afforded a speedy 
trial is denied. 
10-24-94 Petitioner present with new counsel, Mary Corporon. 
Petitioner waives right to speedy trial. Trial set for 12-13-94. 
12-12-94 Petitioner's motion to have counsel withdraw and to defend 
himself is continued for hearing. 
12-16-94 Petitioner waives time for speedy trial and WAIVES 120 
DAY DISPOSITION. Defense attorney Mary Corporan is 
allowed to withdraw so that defendant may represent himself 
with aid of standby counsel. 
1-9-95 Scheduling conference is continued at request of new counsel. 
1 -23-95 Trial is set for 3-23-95. 
2-15-95 Motion to allow withdrawal of counsel Bradshaw. 
2-24-95 Counsel Bradshaw's motion to withdraw is granted. New 
counsel appointed - Bel Ami Montreux. Petitioner waives 
right to speedy trial and petitioner's motion to continue is 
granted. Trial reset to 5-30-95. 
5-22-95 Matter reset to 6-12-95 to define issues and set hearing. 
6-12-95 Scheduling conference held. Motion hearing set for 8-1-95. 
Jury trial set for 8-3-95. 
8-01-95 Petitioner's motion to have counsel withdraw and represent 
himself pro se is denied. Petitioner's motion to continue 
trial is denied. 
8-3-95 Trial. 
(R. 2122-23 and 2238-77). 
